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1. Introduction
One basic reason that measurement in psychology requires statistics is that psychologists do
not use copper instruments anymore, as they used to do in the nineteenth century. Instead, they
determine test or total scores on the basis of miniature experiments with discrete outcomes, and
useavarietyofstandardstatististicaltechniquesforreachingconclusionsonthebasisofobserved
data.1 Borsboom (2006) wants us to believe that psychologists are seriously misled in their hope
that they can make progress this way, and recommends an invasion of psychometricians carrying
IRTmissilesandSEMgunsintopsychology. Mypredictionisthatsuchaninvasionwouldsimply
be ignored. That is not to say that whenever psychometric modeling really makes a difference,
no attempts should be made to reach the mainstream of psychology. Indeed, many psychometric
contributions that are obsolete according to Borsboom, like Cronbach’s alpha and exploratory
factor analysis, in fact entered into the mainstream of psychology only because they tend to
provide sensible answers to real problems, which cannot be easily surpassed. We should be more
proudofthem(evenwhenabitvulgarized),andcarefullyfosterouraccumulatedknowledgebase.
Apart from strictly psychometric contributions, it has always been a task of psychometricians
to introduce relevant new developments in the broad domain of mathematics and statistics into
psychology. I am convinced that we should continue to do so, even when it concerns “observed
score techniques” that are so detested in the focus article.
Borsboom is right in pointing out that the impact of IRT modeling in academic psychology
is limited, and that problems of measurement invariance and test bias are ill-understood and
neglected (but of course the IRT movement always had a primary focus on its major successes in
another discipline, educational testing). Of the factors that he mentions as hindering the fruitful
interplay between psychologists and psychometricians, I have no quarrel with the substantive and
with most of the pragmatic ones, but I fail to see the relevance of the theoretical factors. In the
following,Iwilltrytoexplainwhy,andofferanimportantfactoroverlookedbyBorsboom,which
has to do with the changing relation between Cronbach’s (1957) “two disciplines of scientiﬁc
psychology.”
2. Measurement without Copper Instruments
It is undoubtedly true that the single most important and typical contribution of psycho-
metrics to both psychology and statistics is the latent variable. We have true scores, Thurstone’s
Requests for reprints should be sent to Willem J. Heiser, Department of Psychology, Leiden University, P.O. Box
9555, 2300 RB Leiden, The Netherlands. E-mail: Heiser@fsw.leideuniv.nl.
1Thefactthatpsychologistssooftenhavetodealwithdiscreteoutcomes(categoricaldatawithonlyafewcategories,
ordinal data, counts), often with repeated measures, and sometimes with typically structured designs, deﬁnes the niche
for psychometrics in the larger domain of statistics.
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discriminalprocesses,factoranalysis,multidimensionalscalingmodels,structuralequationmod-
els, item response models, and so on. Latent variables are hypothetical entities that may be ﬁxed
(parameters) or random (stochastic variables), and may also be classiﬁed in other ways. They
are the basic elements of measurement models. This framework permits us to transform discrete
psychological responses into numerical outcomes with known quality characteristics. Thus, the
measurement model is a hypothetical copper instrument.
2.1. Role of the Latent Variable
It is often said that measurement models specify theoretical relations between concepts
(latent variables) and observables. That sounds innocent enough, but as Borsboom convincingly
shows in his example of measuring conscientiousness, it leads to an embarrassment of riches. I
concur with Borsboom in that psychological theory is not strong enough to allow a motivated
choice between speciﬁc psychometric models. But I also hold that this weakness is exactly
why research psychologists use the sensible strategy to avoid reliance on hypothetical copper
instruments whenever they can. As I have tried to argue elsewhere (Heiser, 2003), they are not
interested in measurement per se, but in the establishment of (cause and effect) relations.
2.2. Attack Against Classical Test Theory
What can a psychologist do if she wants to report or use a concrete person score? It
seems to me that calculation of scores unavoidably depends on the data. Under the condition of
an embarrassment of riches, suppose she arbitrarily chooses to count those responses that are
positive manifestations of the concept she wants to score. There are old results in psychometric
theory that ensure that she cannot be too far off, compared to other scoring rules. Differences
between weighted and unweighted counting tend to be small if the items being combined are
correlated (Gullikson, 1950, p. 355). Also, under the same type of regularity conditions, there is
a slightly nonlinear, but monotonic functional relation between a latent trait testimate and a true
score estimate (Lord and Novick, 1968, p. 386), implying that the order of the person scores is
identical. Recently, Warrens, De Gruijter, and Heiser (2006) showed that a similar relation exists
between the latent trait person score and the optimal scaling person score.
It turns out that by far the most important consideration is that the items form a homo-
geneous set. There is again an embarrassment of riches in the choice of methods for ﬁnding a
homogeneous set, but once found (approximately), different methods to calculate person scores
are close to equivalent for research purposes (more care may be required for individual selection
decisions). Classical test theory is not obsolete. Psychometric models at the item level are a
reﬁnement. Throwing classical test theory out of the window would only impair the credibility
of psychometrics, and increase the gap with psychology.
2.3. Questionable Interpretations of Test Scores
Theinterpretationofprincipalcomponentsas“biologicallybasedpsychologicaltendencies,”
endowed with causal forces, as cited in Borsboom, is indeed a long stretch of the imagination.
But one cannot blame principal components for this type of wishful thinking. Would it be any
better with latent traits or factor scores? I do not think so. Perhaps we should put part of the blame
on ourselves, since the idea that we can have causal models for correlated data without controlled
interventions arose in our own ﬁeld. Would it be possible that the language of variables with
arrows pointing to each other in supposedly meaningful directions is giving the psychologist the
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2.4. Operationalism Rules
Borsboom is right that psychologists operationalize a lot, but that does not imply that they
believe in philosophical operationalism. Neither do they need to believe in the psychometric
dream of the hypothetical copper instrument, in which observables are related to theoretical
attributes. Rather, like other scientists, psychologists tend to believe in the more general idea of
approximation. As long as some protocol of data collection and/or method of data analysis can
be justiﬁed, as providing an approximation of the psychological variable under study, it will do.
Psychometricians might make ﬁne distinctions between true scores and latent traits, or between
formative and reﬂective models, for psychologists these are just two brands of approximations.
They have to take a leap of faith anyhow, and it requires clear evidence of superiority in a variety
of aspects for one particular method to become the preferred brand.
3. Experiment Without Complete Control
Apart from the measurement problem, there is a second reason why psychological research
needs statistics: it is usually impossible to keep irrelevant variables fully under control. This
difﬁcultyissometimescalledthethirdvariableproblem. Picking upandrulingout thirdvariables
is the driving force of research design. Important methods of control are randomization (adding
chancetotheprocess!),factorialcrossing,blocking,introducingcovariates,andsoforth.Although
third variables can also be controlled ex post facto by regression methods, the Fisherian style of
experimental thinking has caused a revolution in psychological research (Gigerenzer, Swijtink,
Porter, Daston, Beatty, & Kr¨ uger, 1989, Chap. 6). What are the consequences?
3.1. Samples Size Issues
Under this heading, Borsboom launches what at ﬁrst appears to be a side attack against
“experimentally oriented research” and the “various species of ANOVA,” which would involve
betting on observed score techniques and “stealing” assumptions. It is one thing that Borsboom
cannot see the blessing of small sample statistics, but in any case, with this part of his argument
he is not going to win the hearts of psychologists, who are discovering that the great thing of
explanatory or independent variables is that you do not need to measure them.
3.2. The Rise of the Independent Variables
Borsboom underestimates the enormous impact of the movement toward more experimental
research in psychology, with its emphasis on bringing situational variables under tight control, its
attention for causal mechanisms by formulating “cause–effect hypotheses,” and its tendency to
regardindividualdifferencesasanuisancesincetheyincreasewithin-treatmentvariance.2 Incon-
trast to what Borsboom believes, psychologists are much less frequently eye-balling correlations
than they used to do. Fifty years ago, Cronbach (1957) could still write,
In contrast to the Tight Little Island of the experimental discipline, correlational
psychology is a sort of Holy Roman Empire whose citizens identify mainly withtheir
own principalities. The discipline, the common service in which the principalities are
united, is the study of correlations by Nature. While the experimenter is interested
only in the variation he himself creates, the correlator ﬁnds his interest in the already
2Ironically, psychometricians specialized in IRT call the latent variable measuring individual differences a nuisance
variable or, collectively, the nuisance parameters. Although the reason is different, the low esteem for the variations of
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existing variation between individuals, social groups, and species. (Cronbach, 1957,
p. 672)
Cronbach also thought that “the tide of separation in psychology has already turned,” and
mentionsasaprimeexampleMeehl’sintroductionofconstructvalidityintesttheory,“capitalizing
on the methodological and philosophical progress of the experimentalists” [sic!]. Nevertheless, I
believe that ﬁfty years later all signs are telling us that the experimentalists are winning big-time
over the correlationists. The Holy Roman Empire is falling apart, and the Tight Little Island is
growing into an archipelago where the sun never goes down.
The experimental method is triumphing in many areas outside traditional experimental
psychology, like social, developmental, clinical, and even organizational psychology. Time and
space do not permit going deeply into the reasons and effects of this revolution. But a major
methodologicalaspect(andadvantageforthepsychologist)isthattheindependentvariablesneed
not be measured, but instead are manipulated, in which process they are reduced to attributes.
If you study the effect of fear, there are many possible manipulations to create fear that can
be compared with a control condition, but in any case the fear treatment is “on” or “off.”
Reduction to attributes implies that the theoretical model or reasoning to predict the outcome
of the experiment can be qualitative instead of quantitative. Under the experimental method,
psychology can reason in attributes, which explains what Borsboom calls “the almost complete
absence of strong psychological theory.” There is no need for quantiﬁcation, except for the
dependent variable.
3.3. Traits and States
Traits (either manifest or latent) can be dependent variables only in quasi–experiments, for
instance when we compare monozygotic twins raised together and raised apart, since they are
stable person characteristics. When the aim is to change the dependent variable by experimental
manipulation, it must be a state. Quantitative state variables almost always involve counts, rates,
ratings, or time, and are rather intricately related to the substantive research paradigm. They are
neverstandardizedwithrespecttosomepopulation,becauseeffectsofexperimentalmanipulation
are measured with respect to each other or with respect to a control group. They can also be more
“quick and dirty” than standardized tests, because measurement error will only increase within-
treatment variance, but not change between-treatment variance. Although effect size is negatively
affected by measurement error, that involves a calculated risk and not a blind gamble; after all,
a research paradigm comes into wider use only if its originator demonstrates that under typical
circumstances of the setup reasonable to large effect sizes can be achieved.
4. Conclusion
Fisherianmethodologyrulesinpsychology,whilethehomelandofpsychometricsiscorrela-
tional methodology. Borsboom’s timely discussion paper forces us to think hard about strategies
that could save us from isolation and irrelevancy. Some of Borsboom’s suggestions (write text-
books, publish widely) are ﬁne. But from my analysis it should be clear that his suggestion to
become an active psychological researcher is underestimating what it takes to be part of the psy-
chological research community. For almost all of us, it would take an irreversible career change.
When correlational psychology was still strong, one could imagine that psychometricians were
a special kind of psychologist, since—after all—test theory was its infrastructure. But this is no
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There are signs that cognitive psychologists ﬁnally face individual differences as a serious
factor and start modeling them. We should of course support this development whenever we can.
It also appears that the mathematical psychology community ﬁnds itself in similar dangers as we
do. I would strongly favor an attempt for rapprochement. It would add mass and focus if we had
a united platform for the whole of quantitative psychology, following the motto on the cover of
this journal. In the recent past, some of our colleagues have made a career change to statistics,
but such a move only rarely increased their impact. Psychometrics is a discipline by itself, with a
bodyofresultsthatstoodthetestoftime,butnowithastoﬁndanewbalancebetweenpsychology
and statistics.
Latent variables are important, but we should not try to push them at all costs, and they can
no longer be the dominant instrument in our repertoire. Psychology needs a new generation of
statistical techniques adapted to its current challenges. Physiological outcome measures are hot,
so there is a need for functional data analysis. More hierarchical data are collected, so there is a
needformultilevelanalysis.Thereisincreasedinterestinmoderatorvariables,soweshouldwork
on regression trees in (quasi-) experimental setups. These are just a few examples to broaden the
scope of psychometrics.
Finally, psychometrics should care more about its image in the outside world. What we do
not do enough of—and I blame myself, too—is propagating and defending our heritage in the
largerscientiﬁcandpubliccommunity.WeshouldfollowtheexampleofpeoplelikeJohnCarroll,
who took a brave stand against Stephen Jay Gould’s biased views on mental testing and factor
analysis (Carroll, 1995). Join forces with friends, and attack that enemy!
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